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Progress in Med ical Ethics: 
How the Ethicist Can Help 
Paul F. Comenisch, Ph.D. 
In this article Dr. Camenisch 
presents a plea for mutual under-
standing between ethicists and 
medical professionals. He is As-
sociate Professor of R eligious 
Studies at DePaul University and 
is a post-doctoral FellollJ at the 
Texas Institute 0/ Religion. 
There would be some justice or 
at least symmetry in the com-
panion piece to Dr. Lisson's ar-
ticle being authored by a physi-
cian. And in onc sense Charles B. 
Moore has already done this. ! 
But there are also advantages to 
critical reflections and gentle rep-
rimands originating from within 
the fraternity being addressed. 
We ethicists, often with the very 
best of intentions, sometimes cre-
ate our own obstacles by our 
mode of entry into medical areas 
and by some of our unexamined 
working assumptions. We a lso 
often permit existing obstacles to 
stand by, fai ling to clarify the 
nature of the ethical task. Being 
aware of these troublesome ele· 
ments and exorcizing them where 
possible should facilitate progress 
in medical ethics, especiaJly at 
those points where such progress 
hinges on an adequate under· 
standin g of the nature of ethics 
or on good will between the medi · 
cal professionals and institutions 
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(not just physicians) and the 
professional ethicists. 
Territoriality 
The ethicist is often perceived 
by the medlcal professional as an 
invader, a usurper who seeks to 
bring under his own aegis terri· 
tory - problems, decisions, pre· 
rogatives - which has un til now 
belonged indisputably to the 
medical profession. Thus resent· 
ment and resistance are often 
visited on the ethicist who seems 
bent on upsetting the status quo 
or at least on further disturbing 
troubled waters by raising addi· 
tional doubts in the minds of peo· 
pie already uncertain about the 
quality of current medical care, 
the truly human benefits of cer· 
t a i n technologically advanced 
medical procedures, t he justice of 
having to spend so much money 
in the attem pt to preserve their 
life and health. 
The first and most obvious way 
to defuse some of this resentment 
and resistance at being "invaded" 
is for the ethicist to state as 
clearly as possible that the ethical 
issues being raised are not iden-
tical with questions of the per-
sonal ethics - honor, integrity, 
etc. - of the medical profession-
al. But this is not a simple issue, 
and those ethicists who simply 
toss off this distinction as a pan-
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acea for all such unhappiness the 
medica l professional feels have 
simply missed the complexity of 
this issue. 
There is not space here to ex-
plore the various levels on which 
the questions being raised in 
medical ethics might relate to the 
moral/ethical integrity and sen-
sitivity of the medical profession-
al. But most ethicists, being 
teachers, can perhaps grasp some-
thing of what medical personnel 
under ethical scrutiny feel if they 
imagine themselves in an analo-
gous situation. How would we re-
spond to being accused of engag-
ing in practices, of employing in-
structional methods, of partici-
pating in a system wh ich, in spite 
of our own personal integrity, in-
jure, even brutalize and dehu-
manize our students? (Many of 
us, of course, were accused of pre-
cisely this by black groups several 
years ago when they aUacked 
the " institutionalized racism" of 
much of formal education.) In 
such a situat.ion it is some com-
fort, but not reall y enough, to be 
told that one's personal morality 
is not under attack. Such assur-
ances declare us innocent of the 
more obvious, the grosser viola-
tions. But they still imply that we 
have been party to other wrongs 
which we were not perceplive 
enough to detect. And that is no 
compliment. 
Here the I;!th icist can only try 
to make sure tha t medical pro-
fessionals do not read into his 
analysis, his questions and sug-
gestions, personal accusations 
which need not be there and 
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which most often serve only to 
obscure the real issues when they 
do become the focus of aUention. 
A more significant response to 
the medical profession's inclina-
tion to defend its "territory," 
however, is to suggest that so 
long as ethicists are raising the 
right issues, the territory which 
would appear to be in dispute be-
tween the medical and the ethi-
cal professionals in fact belongs 
to neither of them. The territory 
---ethical questions about various 
areas of medical practice such as 
whether some medical procedures 
should be used at all , whether 
some medical research should go 
forward, and if so, under what cir-
cumstances ,etc. - belongs either 
to the patient/ subject involved 
or to the public at large. [n the 
first case, for example, the ques-
tion of whether to elect radica l 
and grossly disfiguring surgery to 
combat cancer or to die probably 
sooner but "intact" is the pa-
tient's question. not the doctor's 
or the ethicist's. And the question 
of whether proxy consent should 
be invoked to permit non-thera-
peutic research on children is a 
question of social policy requiring 
a decision from society at large, 
however difficult that is to obtain 
or to interpret. (This last state-
ment does not mean that moral ity 
is a question of majority vote, but 
on ly that neither doctor nor ethi-
cist can relieve society of the re-
sponsibility to shape its own poli-
cy. its own moral character in 
such matters.) Thus these mat-
ters do not constitute territory to 
be awarded as a prize for excel-
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lence in disputation to either 
medical or philosophical doctor. 
Both may and should make their 
own contribution to the discus-
sion to aid the patient or the pub-
lic in arriving at an informed and 
critical conclusion. But the ques-
tions, the territory itself, are not 
theirs to dispose of between them. 
At most the professions deal 
with such matters as with a trust. 
The medical profession does not 
own the human goods it is de-
signed to provide. These goods -
health, long life, and the sci-
entific-technological a d van c e s 
which are meant to contribute to 
them-are not possessions which 
the profession is free to dispense 
or withhold at its own discretion.2 
These goods are public trusts 
which are most extensively dealt 
with by the medical profession 
simply because it has been en-
trusted by society with what are 
currently seen as the best means 
for securing and maintaining 
them. 
When me d i c a J professionals 
and institutions realize that these 
goods are public trusts, then the 
entrance of qualified and sensi-
tive ethicists into the ethical dis-
cussions which those goods gen-
erate should be met not with re-
sistance and resentment, but with 
relief. To those aware of their 
own fallibility (humanity?) it 
should be an awesome thing to 
hold life and death, health/ 
wholeness and their opposites in 
one's hands. And if ethicists can 
achieve the impartiality, the per-
sonal disinterestedness they as-
pire to, then their analysis, their 
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probings, their suggested resolu-
tions should be no more, and no 
less, than a responsible attempt 
to help the medical profession 
bear this heavy load. For exam-
ple, the ethicist discussing in-
formed consent with research 
physicians should not be defend-
ing some vested interest of his 
own which must be mapped out 
and protected against medical 
personnel. He should rather be 
offering the analyses, the insights 
of ethics to the researchers as 
possible aids in their struggle to 
discover precisely what society 
has entrusted them with in this 
area and how it can be most re-
sponsibly dealt with. 
Clearly the ethicist can not 
stand in the physician's place 
and decide when to operate, when 
to resuscitate, or how to weigh 
t he cost/ benefits of a particular 
therapy. But serious ethical re-
flection does aim at reducing the 
need at such points for medical 
personnel to draw only on their 
own past experience and their 
own hurried reflections. If the 
ethicist can lighten that burden, 
it is not because of his own 
moral/ethical superiori ty but be-
cause of the traditions of sub-
stantive values and commitments, 
of critical analysis, and on rare 
occasion the societal consensus 
he can make available to help in-
form the decisions of the medical 
professional. On t his construction 
of the situat ion in medical ethics 
the ethicist is seen not as an in-
vader of medical territory but po-
tentially as one embodiment of 
society's willingness to help the 
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medical professional bear the 
ethical, decisional burdens at-
taching to the goods he has been 
entrusted with. The mystery here 
is why anyone bearing such bur-
dens would shun any responsible 
attempt to share and t hereby to 
lighten that load. 
The Nature of Ethics 
Part of the physician's feeling 
of being invaded by "aliens" de-
rives no doubt from his correct 
perception that ethicists are rais-
ing questions quite different in 
kind from those the scientifically 
trained physician ordinarily deals 
with. There are severa l ways of 
characterizing this difference but 
here it need only be said that the 
doctor's questions are usually sci -
entific on some significant level 
- that is, they deal with empi ri -
cal data. are usually thought to 
have objective answers that can 
be arrived at by agreed upon 
procedures, answers which can be 
verified, which are the same for 
all competent investigators, etc. 
The ethicist's questions, on the 
other hand, are "soHer" in sev-
eral respects. They seem to be 
answerable only on the basis of 
personal or group preference and 
taste, commitments and values, 
a ll of which are beyond proof. 
And since many practitioners still 
see their fie ld on a strict ly sci-
enti fic model, they sometimes re-
sent even having this sort of issue 
in troduced into it. In some circles 
such resentment is at i ts height 
against theological or religious 
ethicists who are seen not only 
as raising inappropriate questions 
but as offering insights and an-
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swers which are also inappropri-
ate. Such religious insights are 
thought inappropriate because 
they are perceived as deriving 
from the values and commitments 
of a limited group - a particular 
religious community - and as 
resting on some esoteric base 
such as revelation or church au-
thority rather than on "reason." 
There are several important 
misconceptions in this response 
to t he ethicist. First. ethicists do 
not bring the ethical issues into 
medicine - they are already 
there. Wherever situations re-
quire a decision between compet-
ing human goods, there are ethi-
cal choices being made. We might 
refuse to recognize them as such 
and pretend that they can be an· 
swered on some "purely scien-
tific" basis. But that is a dan-
gerous illusion because it permits 
us to keep submerged and unex· 
amined the ethical grounds we 
are operating on. The ethicist 
simply makes the ethical issues 
already present in medicine ex-
plicit as ethical issues and chal-
lenges the profession to confront 
them directly and critically rath· 
er than pretending that they are 
not there. 
Secondly. the ethicist should 
make clear that while it is true 
that ethical questions are quite 
"unscientific," this is no grounds 
for eschewing ethics and tryi ng 
to practice some sor t of "value· 
free" medicine. ("Va lue-free" 
medicine would at best be medi· 
cine in which the values were per-
mitted to remain implicit.) Rath-
er, this realization that ethical 
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analyses and claims rest not on 
some sort of factual or logical 
proof, but ultimately on human 
choice, commitment, on values 
aflinned and goods pursued, 
should be noted and highlighted 
not as the death of ethics but as 
a crucial insight into the nature 
of ethics - and in fact in to much 
of human li fe. The fact which 
must be faced by medical profes-
sionals and all scientifically 
trained experts who might be 
tempted to take retuge behind 
their expertise is that they have 
been and will be making this kind 
of choice on this kind of ground, 
and that such choices - at least 
where they impinge on t he well-
being of others - must now be 
made the subject of public dis-
cussion. 
Finally, if the above assertions 
about the nature of ethics and the 
grounds of ethical decision mak-
ing are correct, then theological 
ethicists must boldly respond to 
those who accuse us of speaking 
from a limited base of commit-
ments and convictions while other 
ethicists presumably speak from 
some broader, even universal 
base. We must insist that all nor-
mative ethics finally rest on con-
viction, that every et hic is a " be-
lievers' ethic." That is, that ul ti-
mately it speaks only for and to 
those who share its convictional 
base. Religious ethics is unique 
here only in that it publicly pro-
claims its base. Other ethicis ts, in 
making no such public declara-
tions, create the illusion of having 
nothing to declare. But that is 
an illusion and should be exposed 
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as such. 
Thus t he question is not 
whether ethical decisions will be 
made in medicine, but whether 
they will be faced as ethical and 
confronted openly and critically. 
And if the latter question is an-
swered affirmatively, the next 
question is not whether we will 
respond to them on the basis of 
some specific group's convictions 
and values, but rather which 
groups and/ or individuals will be 
permitted to offer their commit-
ments and values as possible 
starting points for ethical delib-
eration. Open acknowledgmen t 
and careful elaboration of these 
points about the nature of all 
ethical reflection will a id progress 
in medical ethics by making clear 
the sort of task we are engaged in. 
Constituency 
All too often ethicists seem to 
cast themselves in the role of de-
fender of the public interest 
against the harm done by self-
seeking and/ or morally insensi-
tive and/ or et hicall y inept 
medical professionals. While this 
assigning of roles is often only 
tacit , the medical partners in the 
discussion are alert to it and are 
rightfully resentful of the various 
ways in which it shapes the dis-
cussion. Such an assigning of roles 
is unfair and inaccurate on sev-
eral counts. First, the ethicist 
rarely succeeds in being a per-
sonally disinterested, entirely 
"objective" champion of the pub-
lic good. We too have our vested 
interests. Ours are perhaps less 
obvious and are surely less re-
warding financially than those 
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the medical professionals are of-
ten accused of; but t hey are 
equally capa ble of distorting our 
analysis and our arguments. Who 
among us would not like to be 
acclaimed as a giant-killer, or at 
least as a fu ll professor on the 
basis of having tweaked the 
giant's beard? And what more 
likely candidate is t here for the 
role of Goliath today than the 
medical network? 
Secondly, this assigning of roles 
is unfa ir since the medical pro-
fessional is seldom as devoid of 
t he worthier motivations - com-
passion, a sense of public service, 
etc. - as t he critic often suggests 
he or she is. This is so obvious 
t hat it needs no elaboration here. 
But perhaps the most signifi-
cant misrepresentation in this 
view of the ethicis t's role is t he 
assumption tha t he speaks for t he 
public. On the basis of the pre-
sumed pu ri ty of our motives and 
the intensity of our dedication to 
defending the public good, we of-
ten declaim and exhort as though 
we were the officially appointed 
spokesmen for the voiceless 
masses - as though they them-
selves had sent us in to t he fray 
as their last, best hope. But clear-
ly we have no such constituency. 
We have received no such man-
date, no such vote of confidence. 
We do not speak for the masses 
except in the limited sense of urg-
ing courses of action which we 
see as serving their best interests. 
Thus it is presumptuous of us to 
conduct ourselves in ways which 
seem to say to the medical fie ld, 
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"We have come to speak fo r those 
you serve but whom you do not 
hear - they have sent us - we 
speak with their voice!" When 
either ethical or medical profes-
sionals assume this role, they 
engage in an unbecoming pater-
nalism which is a discredit to 
t hemselves and a disservice to 
the public. 
Strategically it is unwise of 
ethicists even to raise this ques-
tion of the constituency we speak 
for since the medical professiona l 
can easily pu t us to shame on this 
count. The publ ic at least knows 
who the medical professionals are 
and what they do. And in the 
continuing insistent demand for 
their services the public continues 
to give them something very like 
a vote of confidence. It may be a 
grudging vote qual ified by con-
cern over the cos t and qual ity of 
care, and even by the ill -defined 
wish that some alternative were 
available. But so long as the over-
whelming majority of the people 
turn to medica l professionals in 
their search for health, long life 
and deliverance from suffering, 
the medical network has an im-
pressive constituency for which it 
can in some limi ted capacity 
speak. Thus ethicists must not 
draw ba ttlelines which pu t them-
selves and the public on one side 
and the medical professionals and 
institut ions on the other. 
The temptation which lies in 
wait here fo r t he ethicist is a sub-
t le but dangerous one. I recently 
attempted to survey t he physi-
cian examining and licensing 
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boards in the country's fifty-one 
jurisdictions concerning t he ethi-
cal dimensions and implications 
of physician licensing. At my last 
coun t only sixteen of them had 
responded. I was originally in-
dignant at the arrogance of these 
boards to which the public has 
entrusted such great res ponsi-
bility and gran ted such great 
privilege in denying to the public 
insight into how they perceive 
and carry out their public t rust. 
The fallacy here, of course, is 
that in request ing such informa-
tion I was in no real sense acting 
as a representa tive of the public. 
Denying the reques ted informa-
tion and in terpreta tions to me 
could not simply be equated with 
denying it to the public. And in 
pretending that it could I wa .. 
assuming an office to which I had 
no legitimate claim. I am still in-
clined to be indignant over the 
mat.ter. And on the basis of some 
of the boards' past records I sus-
pect that some arrogance was at 
work along with other morc legi-
ti mate and practical reasons for 
not responding to the question-
naire. But any such indignation 1 
feel cannot be predica ted on an 
affron t to the public which did not 
in fact. occur. If there is arrogance 
in the boards' denial of the in-
formation, nothing is t.o be ga ined 
by matching it wi th my own ar-
rogance. The boards have no right 
to withhold such informa tion 
from the public when it has been 
duly requested. But I have not. 
been commissioned by the publ k 
~o to request it. 
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Expectations 
I have already suggested that 
the ethicist can be too much re-
sis ted and resented. But it is also 
possible on the basis of exagger-
ated expectations for him to be 
too much welcomed. Some moral-
ly concerned physicians apparent-
ly feel they have been deserted 
by the public to bear their bur-
dens alone. In conversations with 
such persons I have sometimes 
had the disquieti ng feeling tha t 
they expected more than I could 
in good conscience deliver, that 
they hoped for answers which 
would once nnd for all set their 
minds at ease. Of course some 
ethical traditions do provide just 
such clear and unambiguous an -
swers. One of the most familiar 
examples here is the official Ro-
man Cathol ic teaching on ma t ters 
such as direct abort ion and mercy 
killing. Ethicists working out of 
such traditions shou ld offer such 
anwers with conviction and with-
out apology. And those of us who 
do not s tand in such t rad ition" 
shou ld know them well enough to 
insure them a fair and informed 
hearing from l-Iympathizer and 
critic alike. But the fact is that 
for reasons too numerous and too 
complex to explore here most 
ethicists do not feel that they 
can provide "answers" in this 
sense. They rather approach the 
questions 'of medical ethics as 
fellow-seekers with the medical 
professional , offering tools which 
they hope will help in their com-
mon pursuit of resolutions to in-
f;o luble human dilemmas. But 
they do not come wi th catalogues 
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of ready answers. For those of us 
operating from this perspective 
we must first see that we do not 
ourselves cultivate any such un· 
realistic expectations. Secondly 
we must take note of them where 
they do exist and firmly disclaim 
them. Being publicly referred to 
as an "expert in ethics" is so 
unnerving precisely because it 
bespeaks such an "answer man" 
understanding of what we are 
about. 
Competing Goods 
In the heat of moral debate it 
is salutary to keep in mind that 
in virtually all ethical dilemmas 
there are competing goods all of 
which we cannot simultaneously 
maximize. (That, in one import· 
ant sense, is what makes it an 
ethical dilemma.) Consequently 
we must choose which among 
these competing goods or values 
will be given priority. In addition 
_ and here is the crux of the 
matter - we must remember 
that this choice is one about 
which persons of good will may 
in conscience disagree. For ex-
ample, the resea rch physician 
who chooses the future benefits 
wh ich may result from non·thera· 
peutic research on a child over 
the absolute inviolability of his 
her privacy, bodily integrity, etc., 
is not thereby revea led to be a 
ghoul choosing the darkest of 
evils over a self-evidently over· 
whelming good. The physician 
has chosen one good from among 
the various goods available. Not 
all of us will agree with that 
choice. But we should at least be 
able to see how that choice makes 
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sense in the world the doctor 
sees. Any opposition to it must 
therefore reflect the respect we 
should always feel in the presence 
of a conscientiously choosing 
moral agent. Of course, we might 
in this case feel that t his choice 
favors the most immediate, the 
most empiricnl and possibly the 
most superficial of the competing 
goods. But it is nevertheless a 
good chosen and not an evil em· 
braced, and the choice and the 
chooser should not be morally 
disqualified or excoriated because 
it is a choice we happen nol to 
agree with. 
It is particularly distressing 
when ethicists let a single and 
often rather limited moral issue 
disproportionately s h a p e their 
response to medical professionals 
and ignore the fact that many 
such proressionals appropriately 
perceive their entire professional 
identity and involvement as a 
moral undertaking. To ignore this 
latter much larger moral reality 
because the med ica l professional 
is not alert to the latest "hot" is-
sue in medical ethics is a serious 
injustice. For example, it is dis-
tressing on one level to see medi· 
cal professionals SO vcry disturbed 
over malpractice insurance costs 
(especially when it is not accom· 
panied by equal concern over 
sky·rocl{eting patien ts' medical 
costs), and in some instances to 
see their practice of medicine so 
significantly guided by their de· 
sire to avoid malpractice suits. 
This is dis turbing primarily be· 
cause such facts suggest that the 
medical professional has traded 
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in the traditional professional 
dedication to serving the public 
for the less edifying selF-serving 
quest for economic gain. But we 
must also recognize that such 
concern might reflect the profes-
sionals' awareness that the mal-
practice issue is threatening seri-
ously to disrupt the only system 
we currently have by which they 
can deliver to the public essential 
services they feel morally com-
IDitted t.o making available. The 
malpractice situation is therefore 
seen as a threat to their ability to 
make good their entire profes-
sional-moral commitment . Ad-
mittedly this interpretation of 
the profession's response to the 
malpractice situation is too ideal-
istic to fit with the public's cur-
rent assessment of the medical 
network as a whole. But this fact 
alone gives us no real grounds for 
dismissing it, and therefore no 
grounds for ignoring it and simi-
lar more inclusive moral commit-
ments in any fai r response to the 
medical profession. 
Origins of the Present Situation 
It is not always flattering to be 
in the spotlight. The maintenance 
of good will with medica l person-
nel and institutions requires that 
we keep clearly in mind the vari-
ous influences which have put 
medicine in the ethical spotlight. 
Tn most cases it is reasonable to 
assume that a Cocus on the ethics 
of a group or field follows a gen-
eral agreement that those ethics 
have fallen to a conspicuously low 
level. The widespread but appar-
ently short-lived concern with the 
ethics of politicians and attorneys 
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immediately following Watergate 
would conform to this pattern. 
But such an assumpt ion would 
not be fair in the case of medical 
ethics. The amount of attention 
being given medicaJ ethics cur-
rently is disproportionate on sev-
eral counts. It does not reflect an 
alarming disintegration of ethics 
and morals in medicine either in 
some absolute sense or in com-
parison to other professional! 
occupational groups. Nor is it 
proportional to the amoun t of 
harm the public suffers at the 
hands of medical personnel and 
institutions which the ethicist 
wants to reduce through his in-
volvement there. Surely other 
sectors of society such as the eco-
nomic, the legal and the poli tical 
inflict as much harm on the pub-
lic as does t.he medical. 
Medical ethics has attained the 
prominence it has not primarily 
for any such negative reasons 
which would reflect discredit on 
the medical profession , but rath-
er because of the coincidence of 
a variety of positive influences. 
Most. obvious among these are the 
impressive scientific-technological 
advances made in medicine in t.he 
last two decades which presented 
vast new possibilities for doing 
both good and harm. These pos-
sibilities frequently arose in ethi-
cally uncharted waters and there-
fore pressed the medical profes-
sionals themselves, as well as the 
public and t he ethicists, to sub-
ject them to careful mora l ex-
amination. 
A second major influence was 
the willingness of various sources, 
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mostly private, to fund investiga-
tion into medical ethical issues. 
This willingness arose in part 
from the developments just men-
tioned, but also in part from a 
continuing concern about medical 
issues of longer standing. And fi-
naliy, medical ethics has pros-
pered because of the willingness 
of many within the medical pro-
fessions and institutions to enter 
into discussions, to host confer-
ences, and in other ways to foster 
and participate in such inquiry. 
Thus it behooves all of us to re-
member tha t while being in the 
spotlight is not always a flatter-
ing or pleasant experience, the 
simple fact that medical ethics is 
currently there is in itself no neg-
ative comment on the moralf 
ethical state of the medical field . 
We should also be aware of the 
almost universa l tendency to blow 
out of proportion those instances 
of moral failing - greed, decep-
tion, self-seeking - we some-
times find among medical profes-
sionals and institutions. This is 
an understandable reaction to 
such shortcomings in a profes-
sional group when the aspirations 
and claims of that group and the 
public's expecta tions of it are so 
high. Such wide disparity be-
tween the idea l sought and the 
actual perfonnance observed does 
perhaps warrant some indigna-
tion. But such a response should 
not blind us to the fact that such 
failings seldom fall below what is 
publicly admitted to by, and even 
expected of, most other gainfully 
employed persons in the econo-
my. An ambitious power-seeking, 
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money-and-status-pursuing vice-
president of General Motors is no 
cause for public scandal. A doc-
tor operating on similar criteria is 
more disconcerting, but is ground 
neither for condemning the pro-
fession as a whole nor for reading 
the individual involved out of the 
human race. 
Remembering Who We Are 
One last suggestion aims as 
much at benefitting the e thicist 
himself as at cultivating good will 
between him and the medical pro-
fessional. It might, however, con-
tribute to this latter goal as well 
by making clear what kinds of 
credentials can rightly be reo 
quired of the medical ethicist. As 
I understand ethics and there-
after medical ethics, an ethicist 
working in medical issues -
whatever title he carries - must 
be an ethicist before he can he a 
medical ethicist. And the former 
remains his prior, his more basic 
identity even after he has be-
come a "medical" ethicist. 
Whether we "do" our ethics out 
of theological, philosophical, be-
havioral scientific or some other 
starting poin ts, our identity as 
ethicists is a necessary prerequi. 
site to doing medical ethics. 
This conviction has severa l 
grounds and several implications. 
The implications are of more in-
terest here. Fi rst, it means that 
however deeply we get involved in 
medical ethics we cannot afford 
to let our roots in critical ethics, 
wherever they are sunk , wither 
and die. If that happens we have 
nothing to offer in the medica l 
or any other area but intuitive 
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ad hoc suggestions. Secondly, it 
means that we need not be medi-
cal experts in order to do medical 
ethics. We need not "read all the 
literature." The medical people 
with whom we converse must 
keep up with their lield. And we 
need to be " up" enough to be able 
to join in their conversation with-
out bringing it to a dead halt by 
continual requests for elementary 
information. But unless we have 
paraded ourselves as medical ex-
perts we have no need to be such 
in order to do medical ethics. The 
feeling that we must be informed 
on every breaking medical story 
rests on the assumptions that ev-
ery medical advance raises new 
ethical problems, and that only 
we can solve those problems. 
Both assumptions are false. Most 
medical advances offer new oc-
casions for bringing to bea r long 
established values. commitments 
or principles, but seldom do they 
raise totally new issues. Heart 
transplants, while radically new 
technically, were humanly and 
morally sUII about the value of 
life, respect for life, respect for 
the dying, etc., values which have 
helped shape moral reflection for 
millenia. The second assumption 
is also false. We need not, in fact 
we cannot without preempting 
the moral agency of the medical 
personnel and the patient/ suh-
jects involved, make the applica-
tions of the principles or values 
in every case. Such applications 
lie in the realm of prudence, a 
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virtue which every agent must ex-
ercise for himself. We cannot as-
sume that when we as professional 
ethicists are not on the "cutting 
edge" of medical advances, there 
is no one there to deal with the 
ethical implications. 
The above items, kept firmly in 
mind and said aloud when others 
overlook them, can contribute to 
progress in medical ethics. Where 
the above seems too harsh on 
ethicists it should be taken as a 
personal confession of this ethi-
cist and not as a rebuke aimed 
at medical ethicists in general. 
Where it seems too gent le on the 
medical professionals and institu-
tions it should be taken no t as a 
rejection of needed critical and 
sometimes divisive moral analysis 
of the difficult problems in medi-
cal practice, but as a plea for 
mutual understanding between 
ethicists and medical profession-
als as well-intentioned fellow 
seekers of the good. I t is hoped 
that such an understanding will 
make it possible for ethical de-
bate to center on the crucial 
substantive issues facing us in 
medicine rather than on the per-
sonal failings of which we all have 
our share. 
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